Rivista del Diritto Commerciale e del diritto generale delle Obbligazioni

Abstract: The overhaul of the Italian regulation of loans given by shareholders in times of crisis, carried out by the recent Insolvency Law (so called “Codice della crisi d’impresa e dell’insolvenza”) and which will come into force on 14 of August 2020, aims at preventing shareholders from attempting to forestall a liquidation of the company by extending a loan and thereby transferring onto the company’s creditors the risk of failure of the rescue. This paper purports to show the theoretical impact of the reform, while underscoring the conceptual inconsistencies deriving from the approach of the Italian legislator which is based on a “double track” of rules (partly originating from corporate law and partly allocated in insolvency law). The paper concludes with some remarks on the debated topic of shareholder loans within a group of companies.

Sommario: 1. Premessa. – 2. I finanziamenti soci nel sistema originario. – 3. Il codice della crisi: i profili di continuità. – 4. (Segue): i profili di discontinuità. – 5. (Segue): i finanziamenti anomali endogruppo.

Keywords: Bankruptcy — Shareholder Loans — Subordination — Fraudulent Conveyance — Group of Companies.